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Resumen
En este trabajo refl exionamos sobre el papel que puede desempeñar la política fi scal en la 
solución a la crisis de la zona del euro, caracterizada por niveles de endeudamiento públicos 
y privados elevados, que se acompañan de problemas de crecimiento y de competitividad. 
Analizamos el caso español como ejemplo paradigmático de las difi cultades creadas por 
un endeudamiento elevado y de la presencia de desequilibrios internos y externos. En 
primer lugar, se describe el proceso de generación de los desequilibrios durante el período 
1995-2007. Con posterioridad, se discute cómo la corrección de los desequilibrios 
macroeconómicos condiciona el progreso en la consolidación fi scal y cómo este último afecta 
a la corrección de los desequilibrios. Concluimos que el papel que la política fi scal puede 
desempeñar en estos países para expandir la demanda y reducir los costes asociados a 
la corrección de los desequilibrios internos y externos es limitado. La mejor contribución 
que la política fi scal puede efectuar en este contexto es a través de reformas del gasto 
público y del sistema impositivo, dirigidas a estabilizar la ratio de deuda pública. Esta 
política fi scal debe combinarse con reformas estructurales que aumenten la productividad 
de la economía y con mejoras del grado de regulación y competencia de los mercados, de 
forma que se reduzcan los costes de corto plazo de la devaluación interna.
Palabras clave: desequilibrios macroeconómicos, política fi scal, crisis de la zona euro.
Códigos JEL: E62, H30, J11.
Abstract
In this paper we refl ect on the role that fi scal policy could play in the resolution of the crisis 
in Eurozone countries crippled by both public and private debt, and beset by growth and 
competitiveness problems. As an illustration, we revisit the Spanish case, a paradigmatic 
example of the economic diffi culties created by high debt and internal and external 
imbalances. After describing the build-up of fi scal and macroeconomic imbalances in 
Spain during the period 1995-2007, we fi rst discuss how the correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances conditions progress on the fi scal consolidation front and, secondly, how fi scal 
consolidation affects the correction of imbalances. We conclude that the role that national 
fi scal policies can play in these countries to expand demand and reduce the costs of solving 
external and internal imbalances seems limited. Also, overall, the best contribution that 
fi scal policy can achieve under these constraints is through a better targeting of government 
expenditures and tax reforms, aimed at introducing permanent measures to stabilise debt 
ratios. These could then be combined with productivity-enhancing structural reforms and with 
improvements in product market regulation to increase competition, so that the short-term 
costs of the internal devaluation required are reduced.
Keywords: macro imbalances, fi scal policy, euro crisis.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H30, J11.
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1 Introduction
We live in unprecedented times. The economic and fi nancial crisis has brought public debt-GDP 
ratios to historically high levels in advanced countries, and population ageing is expected to 
lead to signifi cant pressures to increase public spending in the near future. In parallel, private 
households remain highly indebted, which together with the large fi scal consolidation needs 
limit short-term growth prospects. With a more medium-term perspective, projections for 
potential growth are also subdued, due to a demographic scenario marked by low fertility rates 
and population ageing, and to the meagre possibility of intense productivity growth after the 
technological developments of the ICT revolution have been fully exploited.1
In the Eurozone, the situation is even more complex, as a signifi cant part of these 
debts are mostly cross-border, intermediated by banking sectors that have been weakened by 
the fi nancial crisis and, in some cases, by the bursting of housing bubbles. In addition to these 
events, the reaction of fi nancial markets has led to a situation marked by fi nancial fragmentation 
within the euro area with market participants reacting abruptly to weaknesses in the economic 
and fi nancial positions of individual countries. Furthermore, persistent infl ation differentials since 
the start of EMU, in a context of an appreciating euro, resulted in serious competitiveness losses 
in southern European countries. Hence, these countries are in a conundrum in which both public 
and private deleveraging and relative price adjustments have to take place against a backdrop 
of low (nominal and real) growth and very adverse fi nancial conditions. 
The debate about what fi scal policy can and cannot achieve under these diffi cult 
macroeconomic conditions has gained relevance. The empirical literature on fi scal multipliers, 
which has expanded signifi cantly by making use of new data sets and methodological 
approaches (see, for instance, Kraay, 2012, and Mian and Sufi , 2012), now provides a wide 
array of estimates, based on sample periods, macro covariates, identifi cation procedures, and 
characteristics of the fi scal measures (Ilzetki, Mendoza and Vegh, 2011, Baum, Poplawski-
Rivero and Weber, 2012). Some recent papers also look at how the values of the fi scal multiplier 
condition public debt dynamics (e.g. Boussard, de Castro and Salto, 2012). 
Unfortunately, progress on the theoretical front has been scarce. There is burgeoning 
literature on optimal public debt in models with heterogeneous agents (Werning, 2007, Golosov, 
Tsyvinski and Werning 2007), but these papers are more of a normative nature and have little 
to say about the current policy debate on how to deal with predetermined debt. Some papers 
1  Potential productivity growth in advanced countries is a highly contentious issue. Gordon (2012) argues that the rapid 
progress made over the past 250 years could well turn out to be a unique episode in human history and that most 
countries face six headwinds that are in the process of exerting a drag on long-term growth (demography, education, 
inequality, globalisation, energy/environment, and the overhang of consumer and government debt). Bartelsman (2012), on 
the contrary, argues that much higher growth is technologically feasible, but it requires a considerable amount of churn and 
reallocation across firms in the market sector, and that, conditional on the policy environment, labour productivity growth 
in the EU of 3% per year for the next 20-30 years appears attainable.
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have argued that the effects of stabilising fi scal policy are very powerful when monetary policy 
is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and there are agents whose 
borrowings are also constrained (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). To what extent this is relevant 
to guiding policy under the current deleveraging scenario is, however, highly controversial. 
Moreover, there are no reasons to expect symmetric effects of fi scal policies when debt is at 
such a high level that a different policy stance may have very signifi cant effects on fi nancing costs 
(Corsetti, et al. 2012). Finally, as Andrés et al. (2012) argue, less attention has been paid to the 
effect of households’ financial conditions on the fiscal multiplier, which can also give rise to non-
linear effects of fi scal policies (documented empirically, for instance, in Afonso, Baxa and Slavik, 
2011). And, since the ultimate effects of fiscal expansions on the economy crucially depend on 
the reaction of employment – and southern European countries also have high unemployment 
rates – more evidence is needed on the effects of a government spending shock on vacancies, 
employment, and unemployment, including the persistence of unemployment and the possibility 
of it becoming structural (Brückner and Pappa, 2010, and Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari, 2010). 
In this paper we fi rst refl ect on the role that fi scal policy could play in the resolution of 
the crisis in Eurozone countries crippled by both public and private debt and beset by growth 
and competitiveness problems. As an illustration, we revisit the Spanish case, a paradigmatic 
example of the economic diffi culties created by high debt and internal and external imbalances.
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2 Fiscal policy under a debt crisis
2.1 The current scenario
Most empirical papers about the output and employment effects of fi scal policy cited in the 
introduction have an Anglo-Saxon bias. Thus, when focusing on the situation of some country 
members of the euro-zone, it seems that some important considerations are neglected in this 
literature. First, a signifi cant part of the recently accumulated debt in UEM countries that is now 
being deleveraged is external, not between savers and borrowers of the same closed economy 
(as in Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). Hence, issues like real exchange rate misalignments, 
home bias in tradable goods and assets, and risk premia are relevant to the analysis of the 
potential impact of fi scal policy. Moreover, there is an excess of accumulated debt as a result of 
either overoptimistic expectations or a sudden permanent drop in potential growth over the long-
run, both phenomena neglected by rational expectations models and/or models without long-run 
trends (as usual in the DSGE camp). Thus, most recent papers on fi scal policy still consider 
risk-neutral households involved in smoothing income fl uctuations under a debt constraint and 
analyze the consequence of the debt constraint becoming more binding. However, one may 
think that the current scenario in Southern Europe resembles, instead, one in which risk-averse 
households are in a deleveraging process caused by a correction of overoptimistic expectations 
on potential growth, while the main source of demand has to come from abroad, and external 
funding is scarcer and more costly. 
2.2 Asymmetric effects of fiscal policy
In this situation, the usual transmission mechanisms of fi scal measures need to be reconsidered. 
First, using expansionary fi scal policy to transfer resources to households so that their borrowing 
constraints are somehow relaxed, and, hence, increasing consumption, may not work if debt-
constrained private agents are involved in a deleveraging process in which consumption is 
determined, not by current income, but by the new desired level of debt. On the contrary, 
reducing public expenditures may not have the well-known expansionary Ricardian effects if 
expectations about future income growth remain subdued. Moreover, at the current debt levels, 
it is very likely that fl uctuations in public debt are associated with changes in fi nancing costs, 
so that the negative short-run effects on output of reducing public debt may be compensated 
by lower interest payments, while increasing public debt may raise fi nancing costs and, hence, 
produce smaller short-run positive output effects. Thus, “fi scal multipliers” seem, more than 
ever, very dependent on the fi scal measure implemented, on its impact on fi nancing costs, 
and on expectations on future growth, so that it is very likely that using a single number to 
characterize the short-run impact of fi scal policies could be very misleading. 
These considerations raise two types of asymmetries or non-linear effects of fi scal 
policy. One is the dependence of the value of the fi scal multiplier on the state of the economy 
or on the level of some particular macroeconomic and/or fi nancial variable that, beyond some 
thresholds, exert strong infl uence on the effect of fi scal policies. This is a possibility that has been 
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extensively researched in recent empirical work (see, for instance, Baum et al., 2012 and Afonso 
et al. 2011). The other type of asymmetry that has not received so much attention, in neither the 
empirical nor the theoretical literature, is the possibility that the effects of a positive fi scal shock 
may not be of the same magnitude, albeit different sign, than those of a negative shock, when 
those effects depends very much on the response of fi nancing costs, the state of expectations 
about potential growth, and the ongoing deleverage process in the private sector.  
2.3 Debt, external imbalances, internal and fiscal devaluations
Together with high public and private debt, Southern European countries have a competitiveness 
problem, which needs to be resolve by price adjustments that shift resources from non-tradable 
to tradable sectors and that depreciate their real exchange rates. Obviously, these adjustments 
are the less costly, the higher productivity growth and the increase in external demand are. It 
is often argued that depreciating the real exchange rate by means of an “internal devaluation”, 
achieved by nominal wage reductions, is a non-starter since this would increase the private 
debt burden, lower public revenues and, hence, worsen the public debt dynamics, a way 
of thinking that is reminiscent of the Fisherian debt defl ation dynamics (Fisher, 1933). This 
has led to some authors (Farhi et al., 2012) to suggest an alternative route, namely, a “fi scal 
devaluation”, consisting of reducing non-wage labor costs (e.g., social security contributions) 
and increasing consumption taxes, to cheapen the prices of domestically produced goods with 
respect to goods produced abroad. 
Both arguments, the relevance of Fisherian debt defl ation dynamics and the convenience 
of a fi scal devaluation, might not fi t well with the current situation in Southern Europe. As for 
Fisherian debt defl ation dynamics, it is based on a logic that applies to closed economies without 
unemployment, in which changes in real wages necessarily imply lower demand and disposable 
income. However, the impact of real wage cuts on demand and household disposable income 
in open economies with unemployment depend on the implied real exchange rate depreciation 
and on the wage-elasticity of employment, which may be small in the short-run, but surely it 
is non negligible, in particular if structural reforms to increase product market competition and 
enhance productivity are implemented simultaneously. Regarding a fi scal devaluation, while this 
proposal may deserve some consideration since in particular it might help in the transition to 
a new equilibrium, it should be taken into account that in the long-run this type of measures 
are only neutral on employment. Moreover, to have a signifi cant impact on the short-run, the 
reduction in non-wage labor costs and the commensurate increase in consumption taxes may 
need to be large and it requires not to be translated into higher wages or margins. Finally, in 
countries where pension systems are under pressure and are mainly fi nanced by social security 
contributions, their reduction will require a clear plan for either reducing pensions’ expenditure 
or raising additional revenues.
Hence, it seems that the competitiveness adjustment has to come from the two usual 
channels: i) nominal wage cuts, in the short-run, and ii) productivity growth, in the medium 
to long-run. How in the current high debt/low growth context fi scal policy has to be designed to 
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smooth this adjustment is a real challenge, more so if structural reforms are not also designed 
and implemented to make prices more fl exible, eliminate barriers to the creation of new fi rms, 
and laying out a labor legislation that favors changes in work organization within fi rms and make 
job creation and job destruction patterns more conducive to productivity growth. 
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3 Fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances: The Spanish case
Spain is a perfect case study for analyzing fi scal policy under the constraints imposed by high debt 
— public, private — and macroeconomic imbalances — internal and external —. The path to this 
weak current situation started from a positive apparently healthy fi scal position prior to the crisis; 
and continued with a rapid deterioration in the budget and debt dynamics, and a negative spill-
over from the ongoing consolidation of public debt sustainability to the growth outlook in a context 
of long-term adjustment of the economy, and a mild adjustment of the imbalances (see Chart 1). 
How macroeconomic imbalances were originated in the Spanish case has been 
documented in many papers (see, for instance, Gavilán et al., 2011a and 2011b). Upon entry in 
the UEM, the fall in interest rates and the expansion of credit gave impulse to a large expansion 
in demand and to a housing bubble. Lack of a supply response, despite large immigration fl ows 
and because of low productivity growth, generated a real exchange rate appreciation, large 
current account defi cits, and the build up of external debt. 
As to the fi scal domain, in late 2007, after a long period of high growth, Spain had a fi scal 
surplus of close to 2% and a public debt/GDP ratio of 36% (against a defi cit of 7% and a debt 
to GDP ratio of 70% in 1995). However, beneath this healthy position lay some worrying public 
revenue and spending dynamics. Of the total reduction in the defi cit recorded between 1995 and 
2007 (8.4 pp of GDP), almost 5 pp were attributable to the business cycle and to the decline in 
the interest burden, associated above all with the reduction in interest rates (see Chart 2). The 
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rest of the adjustment was due to an exceptional increase in tax revenues – with a signifi cant 
temporary component – linked largely to the excessive real estate expansion, which more than 
offset the reduction in revenue of approximately 3 pp of GDP arising from discretionary changes 
in the tax system, while primary public expenditure (excluding interest payments on public debt 
and net also of unemployment benefi ts), grew at an annual rate of more than 7%, clearly above 
trend economic growth.
The crisis revealed the latent risks in the public fi nances situation. During the economic 
crisis (with GDP falling by –3.8% in 2009 after having increase only by 0.9% in 2008), the budget 
defi cit rose by more than 13 pp to a peak of 11.1% of GDP at end-2009. Contributing to the 
deterioration from 2007 to 2009 was the adverse trend of the business cycle, which added around 
2.5 pp of GDP, whereas close to 4 pp of GDP were associated with the drying-up during the crisis 
of extraordinary revenue. In addition, the measures applied in an attempt to alleviate the effects of 
the crisis amounted to 3.3 pp of GDP, although more than half of this effect was of a temporary 
nature. The rest of the increase in the defi cit arises from trend growth in expenditure outpacing 
that of the economy. The rise in the defi cit, therefore, had an eminently structural component.
In 2010 the consolidation process started to come up against the enormous diffi culties 
associated with pursuing a reduction of the public defi cit while simultaneously undertaking an 
adjustment of previous macroeconomic imbalances. Despite consolidation, public debt has 
continued increasing, while private deleveraging is progressing slowly, in a context of a double dip-
recession with GDP falling again in 2012 at –1.6% after an almost fl at growth in 2010 and 2011 
(–0.2% and 0.1%, respectively). We turn to the discussion of these diffi culties now. For this purpose, 
we divide the discussion into two blocks. First, we analyse how the correction of the imbalances is 
conditioning the fi scal consolidation process; then, we discuss the converse implication, how the 
fi scal consolidation process is conditioning the correction of the macro imbalances.
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4 How the correction of macro imbalances conditions the fiscal consolidation process
A natural starting point for analysing the diffi culties of the fi scal consolidation process in a 
context of correction of the previously accumulated imbalances is the debt dynamics equation. 
Chart 3 (scenario 1) plots the course of the public debt/GDP ratio over the coming years under 
specifi c assumptions of budget defi cit, interest rates and growth rate. Specifi cally, on the current 
offi cial estimates, the fi scal defi cit stood at around 7% at end-2012 (excluding an additional 
3.7 pp. due to costs associated to banking re-structuring). With this starting point, we use the 
growth scenario to 2016 included in the latest Stability Programme of the Spanish government, 
prolonged until 2020 to match an average nominal GDP growth of 3.5% in the period 2013-2020 
(1,5% real GDP growth + 2% GDP defl ator growth), and the assumption of an average nominal 
interest rate of public debt in the same period of around 3.5%, to show that the stabilisation of 
public debt at around 100% of GDP in 2017 would require an adjustment in the primary balance 
of around 6,6 pp of GDP between 2013 and 2017 (see Chart 3). 
Admittedly, part of the fi scal defi cit observed in 2012 is of a cyclical nature (around 
30% of the observed defi cit according to most estimates). However, the size of the pending 
adjustment needed to stabilise the debt ratio is very high by international standards, in particular 
if one takes into account that the primary defi cit has already declined by 5.4 pp of GDP between 
2009 and 2012. By way of comparison, in the consolidation period applied in Spain during the 
1990s, stabilising the debt to GDP ratio at around 70% required an adjustment of the primary 
defi cit of “only” 3.6 pp of GDP in four years (between 1993 and 1996).
Moreover, the fact that the fi scal consolidation process is taking place in a macro 
environment characterised by correction of previously accumulated imbalances is making the 
fi scal adjustment more diffi cult. The most obvious consequence of the correction of these 
imbalances is its impact on growth, which is being negatively affected in particular by the 
deleveraging process under way in the private sector. Indeed, history suggests that recessions 
involving fi nancial crises tend to be deeper and have slower recoveries that take twice as 
long, with deleveraging causing a prolonged period of low internal demand. This is already 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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occurring in the Spanish case: real GDP growth in the Spanish economy was –0.8% on average 
in the period 2008-2012, against 3.8% observed in the earlier 1998-2007 period. Moreover, 
all available medium-term scenarios for the Spanish economy draw a picture of a signifi cant 
decline in growth prospects. The Spanish government projects average real GDP growth for the 
Spanish economy of around 0.4% for the period 2013-2016, while the EC scales this growth 
down to –0.1% in the same period and the EC to 0.2% in the period 2013-2018 (see Chart 4). 
Of course, in our previous public debt dynamics example, if these more pessimistic growth 
scenarios were to materialize, in the form for example of a 1 pp lower real and nominal average 
GDP growth in the period 2013-2020 compared to our central scenario, the stabilization of the 
debt ratio would take place at a higher level and the fi scal effort needed to reach the same target 
for the debt to GDP ratio would be signifi cantly higher (see Chart 3, scenario 2).
A related issue refers to the impact of the lower growth prospects on unemployment 
and, in terms of the public accounts, on unemployment benefi ts. The unemployment rate has 
already increased in Spain in the period 2007-2012 by 17 pp and the related unemployment 
public expenditure by 1.6 pp of GDP in the same period (see Chart 5). This was also the case 
during the 1990s, when unemployment benefi ts increased signifi cantly. However, unemployment 
declined swiftly in that period allowing for a positive contribution of unemployment benefi ts to 
the consolidation process, i.e. this expenditure item declined by 2 pp of GDP between 1993 
and 1999. The high unemployment rate is now signifi cantly more persistent (see Chart 6), which, 
combined with low growth prospects, could lead to the persistence of unemployment benefi ts 
at a relatively high level for a longer period of time, unless average benefi ts and/or the coverage 
rate are reduced. As a result, the adjustment of other public revenues or expenditure items will 
have to compensate for these developments making the adjustment more costly. 
Nevertheless, the correction of the macro imbalances may also have an adverse effect 
on developments in public revenues, deriving from the very nature of the adjustment and its 
impact on the composition of growth. The fact that during the period of adjustment the main 
source of improvement in economic activity is/will continue to be the external sector means 
that the prospect of buoyant public revenue is scant, since neither higher exports nor lower 
SOURCES: INE, Stability Programme of Spain (2013-2016), European Commission and IMF.
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Observed 
(1996-2007)
 2IĺFLDO3URMHFWLRns: 2013 
6WDELOLW\3URJUDPPe (2013-2016)  
(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
('3VFHQDULR(2013-2016)   
IMF DUW 4, $XJXVW
(2013-2018) 
 
 REAL GDP  NOMINAL GDP 
  
%  
  
AVERAGE REAL AND NOMINAL GDP GROWTH ESTIMATES FOR SPAIN CHART 4
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1303
imports generate, per se, increases in tax revenue. This effect is compounded by the intensity of 
the real estate adjustment, a sector of the economy that generates signifi cant public revenues 
both through transaction taxes and the taxation of capital gains. Moreover, the need to gain 
competitiveness through wage moderation also has an adverse effect (more than proportional) 
on revenues through income taxes, given the progressive nature of this type of taxation. 
A way to illustrate this channel is through the residuals of the revenue equations that 
relate public tax revenues to the tax bases and discretionary changes in effective tax rates. 
Usually these equations assume a constant average elasticity of tax revenues to the tax bases. 
Moreover, aggregate measures of tax bases are not able to capture some of the specifi cities of 
the tax system. In particular, capital gains are not typically considered as part of the base but, 
however, they are effectively taxed. As a result, highly positive residuals are often observed in 
tax revenue equations in boom periods, while the opposite occurs in recessions. Chart 7 plots 
these residuals for the Spanish case in cumulative terms for two different periods: 1998-2007 and 
2008-2012. Indeed, the positive residuals during the expansionary period reached, in cumulative 
terms, more that 6 pp of GDP. The opposite has happened during the adjustment process, with 
negative accumulated residuals since 2008 of about 5 pp of GDP. 
The composition of growth derived from the macro imbalance adjustment will include 
an additional element of complexity. This is in our view a crucial point that will condition the 
SOURCE: Labour Force Survey.
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consolidation process. Chart 8 illustrates how a rule limiting public expenditure growth relative 
to potential nominal output growth would have worked in the 1998-2007 period. The rule is 
applied to total general government public spending less the interest burden on public debt and 
less social benefi ts (essentially relating to unemployment and pensions). Indeed, the growth of 
public spending in the 1998-2007 period was signifi cantly higher in Spain than would have 
been the case with the application of the rule (7% in annual average terms, compared with 
4.4%, respectively). Of course, in this context, the fact that public accounts reached a surplus 
at the end of this period was only possible because of the extraordinary revenue arising from 
the real estate boom mentioned above. In the same vein, this illustrates that, even once a 
sound fi scal position has been reached, if the composition of growth in the Spanish economy 
is going to remain tilted towards the external sector, maintaining a healthy fi scal position will 
probably require growth of public expenditure that is below potential output growth for an 
extended period of time.
On the revenue side, however, there could be some scope for improvement. In particular, 
the level of the tax burden continues to be much lower (34% of GDP in 2012) than the average 
of the EU (see Chart 9), even after the signifi cant increases in tax rates approved in the last 
three years. This burden is signifi cantly tilted towards labour taxes while taxes on consumption 
have a much lower share over total taxation. Moreover, the Spanish tax system continues to 
show a high level of the so-called “fi scal expenses”, arising from the presence of deductions and 
SOURCES: IGAE and author’s calculations.
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exemptions on different taxes, representing a major cost in terms of revenue-raising, and adding 
complexity to the tax structure and in some cases exerting signifi cant adverse effects on effi ciency. 
In this context, anything short of a fundamental tax reform may not be of much help. For 
instance, as previously mentioned, there is the recourse to fi scal devaluations (see Farhi et al., 
2011) whose main rationale is to achieve a real exchange rate depreciation by means of shifting 
taxes on labor (and, hence, only on domestic production) to taxes on consumption (which includes 
also foreign products). At the same time, if wages and fi rm margins do not react, there would be a 
reduction of labor costs and a gain in competitiveness that might jumpstart employment creation. 
Thus, fi scal devaluations may help to reduce the current account defi cit at no cost for the public 
budget and, if successful in the employment front, with additional revenues. The condition of wage 
setting not reacting to the reduction of non-wage labor costs may be easier to be fulfi lled in the 
current depressed labor market. However, labour and product market reforms should accompany 
such a measure so as to be certain that wages and margins do not react compensating the initial 
competitiveness gains obtained with the fi scal devaluation. In any case, such a policy measures 
would be helpful only in the transition to the new equilibrium of the economy since one would 
expect its impact to be transitory, so that in the long-run the fi scal devaluation would be neutral 
on employment. Finally, it should be taken into account that in Spain the pension system is mainly 
fi nanced through social security contributions, thus a signifi cant cut of this type of taxation will 
require a parallel reduction of pension expenditures or raising additional sources of revenues.
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5 How fiscal consolidation conditions the correction of the macro imbalances 
As mentioned previously, there are three main imbalances that are in the process of being 
corrected in the Spanish economy: excessive private and public debt, the current account 
defi cit, and the excess of capacity in the construction sector. The process of fi scal consolidation 
can potentially affect the speed and the path of these adjustments through several channels. 
Perhaps the most obvious one is the impact of fi scal consolidation on growth. While it 
is generally acknowledged that fi scal consolidation has a positive impact on growth at medium 
and the long-run horizons, it is also generally accepted that it may affect growth negatively in the 
short run, which, if confi rmed, will complicate the aforementioned low— growth medium —term 
scenario associated with the correction of imbalances. The precise sign and size of this short-
term negative impact, the so-called fi scal multiplier, remain, however, a challenge. The most 
recent empirical evidence on this issue points to the general conclusion that the value of the 
multiplier depends on country — and time — specifi c characteristics (see Baum et al., 2012). 
In particular, this literature highlights that the value of the multiplier may be larger in recessions 
and in fi nancial crises (see Auerbach et al, 2012, Blanchard and Leigh, 2013 and Afonso et al., 
2011), while it tends to be lower in periods of fi scal stress, defi ned as periods of an overly high 
debt to GDP ratio (see Corsetti et al., 2012). Table 1 presents some empirical evidence on these 
state-dependent multipliers for the Spanish case that tends to confi rm the previous results. Our 
reading of the implications of these results is twofold. On the one hand, it is obvious that the 
fi scal effort needed to meet a certain fi scal target is greater in an environment of correction of 
macro imbalances like that currently faced by the Spanish economy, given that this environment 
is characterised by low economic growth and a deleveraging process with low access to credit, 
and that the associated fi scal multiplier will be higher. Of course, if public indebtedness becomes 
too high, fi scal consolidation may even have a positive impact on growth through higher 
confi dence facilitating the consolidation process. Therefore, the design of the fi scal adjustment 
strategy should take into account not only the behavior of economic activity, but also the costs 
of excessive delays in consolidation, in terms of risks to credibility and their impact on agents’ 
confi dence. In this respect, it is important to ask how high fi scal multipliers would need to be 
in order for fi scal consolidation to generate an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e. to 
Regime 4 quarters after the shock 8 quarters after the shock
Expansion 0.47* 0.25*
Recession 1.15* 1.67*
Bad Fiscal Times 0.12 0.16
Good Fiscal Times 0.73* 0.31*
Banking crisis 0.96* 0.89*
No banking crisis 0.61* 0.06
Cumulative Multiplier to a government spending shock
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS. THE SPANISH CASE TABLE 1
 
SOURCE: Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013).
NOTE: * denotes statistical signijcance at the 5% level.
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have the opposite impact to that intended (known as a “self-defeating consolidation”). For this 
purpose in Banco de España (2013) a simulation exercise was performed using the quarterly 
model of the Banco de España (MTBE), in order to analyse the effect of a fi scal adjustment with 
different assumptions for the values of fi scal multipliers (ranging from 0.4 to 1.5). The results 
showed that in all cases the debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced in the medium and long-term, although 
when the ex-ante multiplier reaches 1.5, the public debt ratio may temporarily rise in the short 
term (see Chart 11). The conclusion of this analysis is that, although multipliers are higher than 
on average in the past, they are still within reasonable ranges, so that in general self-defeating 
consolidations should not be expected in the case of Spain.
On the other hand, the negative spill-over of the fi scal consolidation process on growth 
may also complicate the correction of imbalances. In particular, and closely related to the above 
discussion on fi scal multipliers, fi scal consolidation programmes may complicate the efforts of 
the private sector to reduce the debt overhang. The logic follows closely the Fisherian debt 
defl ation argument (Fisher, 1933). As fi scal consolidation has a negative short-run effect on 
output, depressing further wages and prices, the real burden of the debt increases, making it 
more diffi cult for households to reduce their debts, and for the public sector to meet their budget 
consolidation objectives. Notice, however, that this logic applies to a closed economy with fi xed 
employment, where wages and households’ disposable income are equivalent. This is not, of 
course, the current situation of highly indebted Southern European countries where depreciations 
are needed to improve external demand and, if employment were created, there is a large buffer 
of unemployment whose reduction may increase signifi cantly households’ disposable income 
even at lower wages. 
In any case, this potential trade-off between fi scal consolidations and deleveraging needs 
can be illustrated by means of simulations of different fi scal consolidation measures and by analysing 
its impact on household disposable income, the denominator of the household debt ratio. As seen 
in Table 2, the results of these simulations performed with a macroeconomic model estimated for 
the case of Spain (MTBE) show that in general all consolidation measures have a negative impact 
on disposable income, thus exerting in the short run a negative effect on the deleveraging process. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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An additional way of illustrating this problem is shown in Chart 12, which plots three 
household debt ratios: the observed one, a second one in which the numerator (nominal debt) 
is the same but the denominator (disposable income) is obtained by simulating the impact 
of the consolidation measures applied during the period 2010-2012 in Spain on disposable 
income under the previous model and adding this (negative) impact on disposable income to the 
observed series so as to a obtain a new (lower) series of household debt. Under this scenario 
no amount of the increase in disposable income under no fi scal consolidation is assumed 
to be devoted to pay debt. Finally, under the third scenario, we simulate the impact on the 
denominator (disposable income) of eliminating the consolidation but in addition the numerator 
(nominal debt) is also reduced because it´s assumed that all the increase in disposable income 
is “spent” on reducing household debt. These two counterfactual scenarios can be taken as 
extreme examples of what would have really happened. The differences between the fi rst series 
and the other two can be attributed to the (negative) impact of the consolidation process on the 
deleveraging process which, as can be seen from the chart, is not negligible. 
Of course, the previous analysis is incomplete in that it does not incorporate the 
potential impact of fi scal consolidation on the asset side of the balance sheet of households 
(and fi rms), so that even if fi scal consolidation has a negative effect on the debt ratio in the short 
run, the impact on net debt is subject to a higher degree of uncertainty. An important channel 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Consumption taxes 1.75 pp -0.32 0.00 -0.46 -0.39 -0.20
Wage taxes 2.18 pp -1.83 -2.27 -2.89 -3.16 -3.23
Capital taxes 11.83 pp -0.10 -0.36 -0.59 -0.84 -1.07
Government purchases -13.23 -0.71 -0.95 -1.05 -1.11 -1.17
Public Wages -13.52 -2.39 -3.38 -3.70 -3.62 -3.43
Public Employment -13.52 -0.71 -1.62 -2.22 -2.53 -2.58
% Change compared to baselineChange in the
instrument
IMPACT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION ON NOMINAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (a)  TABLE 2 
SOURCE: MTBE simulations.
a Fiscal simulations using the MTBE model.
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
130 
140 
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 OBSERVED HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO (OVER NOMINAL DISPOSABLE INCOME) 
 COUNTERFACTUAL HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO (WITHOUT FISCAL CONSOLIDATION): NONE OF THE INCREASE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME IS DEDICATED T O REDUCE DEBT 
 COUNTERFACTUAL HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO (WITHOUT FISCAL CONSOLIDATION): ALL THE INCREASE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME IS DEDICATED TO RE DUCE DEBT 
  
 
 
IMPACT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION ON HOUSEHOLD DELEVERAGING CHART 12
SOURCE: MTBE simulations.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1303
through which fi scal consolidation could affect the prices of fi nancial and non-fi nancial assets 
is interest rates. This channel may be particularly relevant in the current environment of fi nancial 
instability which has prompted greater investor sensitivity to fi scal imbalances. In this regard, 
the estimates available show that an increase of 10 pp of GDP in the debt ratio gives rise to an 
increase of 50 basis points in long-term interest rates. These effects may, moreover, be greater 
if specifi c levels of public debt are exceeded. A sharp reduction in the budget defi cit and the 
stabilisation of debt would therefore have a signifi cant effect on interest rates with a similarly 
signifi cant impact on asset prices.
Finally, fi scal consolidation can also have an effect on the current account, thus 
facilitating or hindering the necessary adjustment of this imbalance. There is, however, no clear 
consensus regarding the impact of fi scal consolidation on the current account. In general terms, 
a fi scal contraction could lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and an accompanying 
fall in the current account defi cit. This is indeed the theoretical argument behind the so-called 
twin-defi cit hypothesis. In this regard, several studies fi nd that a 1% of GDP fi scal consolidation 
reduces the current account defi cit-to-GDP ratio by 0.1-0.3 percentage points, although there 
is also empirical evidence for twin-defi cit divergence in the case of the US (Kim and Roubini, 
2008). More recently, Bluedorn and Leight (2011) provide evidence that, using an action-
based defi nition of fi scal shock, a 1% of GDP fi scal consolidation raises the current account 
balance-to-GDP ratio by 0.6 percentage point within two years and the improvement is long 
lasting. They also fi nd that the effect of fi scal consolidation on the current account has not 
declined for euro area countries since the adoption of the euro and that the improvement in 
the current account is both through a contraction in investment and through higher saving. 
Table 4 sets out the response of the current account to different fi scal consolidation measures 
using the aforementioned macroeconometric model estimated for the case of Spain. The results 
generally support the results given above. The current account generally improves after the fi scal 
consolidation shock. The size of this improvement is between 0.6 and 0.7 pp of GDP three years 
after a 1 pp of GDP fi scal consolidation measure, although the precise size differs depending on 
the composition of the adjustment.
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Consumption taxes 1.75 pp 0.16 0.46 0.70 0.83 0.87
Wage taxes 2.18 pp 0.08 0.41 0.71 0.84 0.82
Capital taxes 11.83 pp 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.31 0.37
Government purchases -13.23 0.42 0.61 0.67 0.65 0.61
Public Wages -13.52 0.02 0.37 0.64 0.71 0.63
Public Employment -13.52 0.02 0.29 0.64 0.89 1.00
% Change of GDP compared to baseline
Change in the
instrument
IMPACT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION ON CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (a)  TABLE 3
SOURCE: MTBE simulations.
a Fiscal simulations using the MTBE model.
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6 Concluding remarks
Solving macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area requires instruments to shift aggregate 
demand from surplus countries to defi cit countries, together with productivity-enhancing 
structural reforms in the latter to make the adjustment process less painful. However, the role 
that national fi scal policies can play in these countries to expand demand and reduce the costs 
of solving external and internal imbalances seems limited. First, given the high levels of private 
and public debt, there are doubts as to whether the traditional transmission mechanisms of 
government spending or tax reductions, either in Ricardian or Neokeynesian models, would 
operate as such, when households adjust consumption to appreciably lower their debt and 
public debt fi nancing costs might respond signifi cantly to changes in the fi scal stance. Secondly, 
asymmetric and non-linear effects of fi scal policy are very likely to arise in this context. However, 
changes in the composition of government expenditures and in tax structures would be very 
welcome to increase effi ciency and redistribute the costs of the adjustment process more fairly, 
but they cannot meaningfully untie the knots between macro imbalances and fi scal policy that 
we have illustrated in this paper by looking at the Spanish situation. Overall, it seems that the 
best contribution that fi scal policy can achieve at the current juncture is through a better targeting 
of government expenditures and tax reforms, aimed at introducing permanent measures to 
stabilise debt ratios. These could then be combined with productivity-enhancing structural 
reforms and with improvements in product market regulation to increase competition, so that 
the short-term costs of internal devaluation are reduced. 
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